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Abstract
Enforcement of a high-level statement of security policy
may be difficult to discern when mapped through func-
tional requirements to a myriad of possible security ser-
vices and mechanisms in a highly complex, networked
environment. A method for articulating network security
functional requirements, and their fulfillment, is presented.
Using this method, security in a quality of service frame-
work is discussed in terms of “variant” security mecha-
nisms and dynamic security policies. For illustration, it is
shown how this method can be used to represent Quality of
Security Service (QoSS) in a network scheduler benefit
function1.
1  Introduction
Several efforts are underway to develop middleware
systems that will logically combine network resources to
construct a “virtual” computational system  [4]  [7]  [8]
[15] . These geographically distributed, heterogeneous
resources are expected to be used to support a heteroge-
neous mix of applications. Collections of tasks with dispar-
ate computation requirements will need to be efficiently
scheduled for remote execution. Large parallelized compu-
tations found in fields such as astrophysics [14] and meteo-
rology will require allocation of perhaps hundreds of
individual processes to underlying systems. Multimedia
applications, such as voice and video will impose require-
ments for low jitter, minimal packet losses, and isochronal
data rates. Adaptive applications will need information
about their environment so they can adjust to changing
conditions.
User acceptance of these virtual systems, for either
commercial or military applications, will depend, in part,
upon the security, adaptability, and user-responsiveness
1. This work was supported by the DARPA/ITO Quorum program.
provided. Several of the projects engaged in building the
middleware to create these networks are pursuing the inte-
gration of security [6]  [10]  [23] and quality of service [1]
[17] into these systems. The need for virtual networked
systems to both adapt to varying security conditions, and
offer the user a range of security choices is apparent.
In the network computing context, users or user pro-
grams may request the execution of “jobs,” which are
scheduled by an underlying control program to execute on
local or remote computing resources. The execution of the
job may access or consume a variety of network resources,
such as: local I/O device bandwidth, internetwork band-
width; local and remote CPU time; local, intermediate
(e.g., routing buffers) and remote storage. The resource
usages may be temporary or persistent. As there are multi-
ple users accessing the same resources, there are naturally
various allotment, contention, and security issues regarding
use of those resources.
The body of rules for resolving network security issues
is called the network security policy, whereas the body of
rules for resolving network contention and allotment com-
prise a network management policy (which is sometimes
taken to include the network security policy). These poli-
cies consist of broad policy jurisdictions, such as schedul-
ing, routing, access control, auditing, and authentication.
Furthermore, these jurisdictions can be decomposed, typi-
cally, into functional requirements, such as, “users from
network domain A must not access site B,” and “user C
must receive a certain quality of service.” The network
management and security policies, as mapped through the
functional requirements, may be manifested in mecha-
nisms throughout the network, including: host computer
operating systems, network managers, traffic shapers,
schedulers, routers, switches and combinations thereof. As
these mechanisms are distributed and are often obscurely
related, there has been some interest in the ability to
express and quantify the level of support for security policy
and Quality of Security Service (QoSS: managing security
and security requests as a responsive “service” for which
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quantitative measurement of service “efficiency” is possi-
ble) provided in networked systems.
The purpose of this paper is to present the system devel-
oped for the MSHN resource management system [8] for
describing network security policy functional require-
ments, to show how QoSS parameters and mechanisms can
be represented in such a system, and to provide an example
of the use of this system. The remainder of this paper is
organized as follows. Section 2 discusses a “security vec-
tor” for quantifying functional support of network security
policy. Section 3 describes how the security vector can be
used for expressing the effects of QoSS in a network-
scheduling benefit function; and a conclusion follows in
Section 4.
2  Network Security Vector
A network security policy can be viewed as an n-dimen-
sional space of functional security requirements. We repre-
sent this multidimensional space with a vector (S) of
security components. Each component (S.c) specifies a
boolean functional requirement, whereby the instantiation
of a network job either meets (possibly trivially) or does
not meet each of the requirements. By convention, a secu-
rity vector’s components are ordered, so they can be refer-
enced ordinally (S.3) or symbolically (S.c). A component
may indicate positive requirements (e.g., communications
via node n must use encryption) as well as negative con-
straints (e.g., users from subnet s may not use node n).
Components can also be hierarchically grouped. [22]
Requirements for a given security service may be repre-
sented by one or more components (indicating a service
sub-vector), and a security service may utilize functions
and requirements of other services and their components.
Some jobs can produce output in different formats,
where a given format (e.g., high resolution video) might be
more resource consumptive than another format (e.g., low
resolution video). Formats may have differing security
requirements, even within the same job. For example, a
video-stream format may require less packet authentication
[19] , percentage-wise, than a series of fixed images based
on the same data. A “quality of service” scheduling mecha-
nism might choose one format for a job over another,
depending on varying network conditions (e.g., traffic con-
gestion). Further, adaptive applications may select formats
depending upon changing conditions. For example, IPSec,
security association (SA) processing using ISAKMP under
IKE can permit complex security choices through an SA
payload; and the payload recipient may be given transform
choices regarding both Authentication Header and Encap-
sulating Security Protocol [13] .
2.1  Notation
The set of all jobs is represented by J. The set of all for-
mats is represented by I. The notation Sij identifies a vector
containing the portions of S that are applicable to job j in
format i, and Sij.c identifies a given component (c) of Sij.
The relation of S to Sij is clarified further, below. The fol-
lowing are some informal examples of security-vector
components:
• S.1: user access to resource is equal to read/write; based
on table t
• S.2: % of packets authenticated >= 50, <= 90; inc 10
• S.3: clearance (user) = secrecy/integrity (resource)
• S.4: length of confidentiality encryption key >= 64, <=
256; inc 64
• S.5: authentication header transform in {HMAC-MD5,
HMAC-SHA}
• S.6: packets from domain A to domain B must be
encrypted
• S.7: packets from domain A cannot be sent through
domain C
Here, “inc 10” indicates that the range from 50 through
90 is quantized into increments of 10, viz: 50, 60, 70, 80,
90. Later, we will need to indicate the number of quantized
steps in the component; to do this, one more notational ele-
ment is introduced, [S.c]. In the above examples, [S.1] = 1,
and [S.2] = 5.
2.2  Variant Security Components
When [S.c] > 1, the underlying control program has a
range within which it may allow the job to execute with
respect to the policy requirement. We refer to this type of
policy, and component, as “variant.” Security-variant poli-
cies may be used within a resource management context,
for example, to effect adaptation to varying network condi-
tions. [18]  Also, if the policy mechanism is variant, the
control program may offer QoSS choices to the users to
indicate their preferences with respect to a given job or
jobs. Without variant mechanisms, neither security adapt-
ability by the underlying control program nor QoSS are
possible, since fixed policy mechanisms do not allow for
changes to security within a fixed job/resource environ-
ment. While the expression S.c may contain a compound
boolean statement (see Section 2.3 ), by convention it may
contain only one variant clause.
2.3  Component Structure
For use in the examples in this discussion, a component
has the following composition (see Table 1  for details):
• component ::=  boolean expression, variant-range-spec-
ifier ; modifying-clause
• boolean _expression ::= boolean_statement [(or | and)
boolean_statement]*
• boolean_statement ::= LHS boolean-operator RHS
Note that it is not the focus here to elaborate on a policy
representation language. See other efforts and works in
progress [2]  [3]  [5]  [16] .
A given policy component has a value which is a bool-
ean expression. This component may also have an instanti-
ated value with respect to a specific job and format, which
is either “true” or “false.” A component has a left hand side
(LHS), which is the item that is being tested; of course the
LHS has a value as well as an instantiated value. A compo-
nent also has a right hand side (RHS), which is what the
LHS is tested against, as well as zero or more modifying
clauses. Similarly to the LHS, the RHS may have a value
(or values) which is dependent on the instantiation of the
component.
2.4  Dynamic Security Policies
With a dynamic security policy, the value of a vector's
components may depend on the network “mode” (e.g., nor-
mal, impacted, emergency, etc.), where M is the set of all
modes. There is, conceptually, a separate vector for each
operational mode, represented as: Smode. Access to a pre-
defined set of alternate security policies allows their func-
tional requirements and implementation mechanisms to be
examined with respect to the overall policy prior to being
fielded, rather than depending on ad hoc methods, for
example, during an emergency.
Initially, every component of S has the same value in
each of its modes. Ultimately, components may be
assigned different values, depending on the network mode.
For example:
• Snormal.a: % packets authenticated >= 50, <= 90; inc 10
• Simpacted.a: % of packets authenticated >= 20, <= 50;
inc 10
Note how [S.a] changes from 5 to 4 under the
impacted mode
• Snormal.b: user access to network node = granted; based
on table t
• Simpacted.b: user access to network node = granted;
based on table t, OR UID in set of administrators
• Semergency.b: UID in set of {administrators, policymak-
ers}
Or, for example, policy makers might decide that the
policy should remain in force regardless of network mode:
• Snormal.c  =  Simpacted.c  =  Semergency.c: clearance (user)
= classification (resource)
Table 1: Simple Component Elements
Element Name Example S.1 Example S.2
Value user access to resource r = RW, based
on table t
% of packets authenticated
>= 50, <= 90; inc 10
Instantiated value false true
Value of LHS user access to resource r % of packets authenticated
Instantiated value of LHS W 70
Boolean operator = >=
Value of RHS RW 50
variant range specifier none applicable <= 90
Modifying clause based on table t inc 10
If a mode is not specified for a component (e.g., “S.a”),
normal mode is assumed. This will be the case (i.e., the
mode is unspecified) for the remainder of this discussion.
2.5  Refinements to Security Vector
R is the set of resources {r1.. rn}. Rij is the subset of R
utilized in executing job j in format i.
Tj is the requested completion time of job j.
Security policies may be expressed with respect to prin-
cipals (user, group or role, etc.,), applications, data sets
(both destination and source), formats, etc., as well as
resources in Rij.
The definition of Sij is finally refined as follows: Sij is a
vector that is an order-preserving projection of S, such that
a component c from S is in Sij if and only if the value of c
depends on format i, job j, or any r in Rij. The number of
components in a security vector Sij is [Sij].
2.6  Summary of Security Vector
S is a general purpose notational system suitable for
expressing arbitrarily complex sets of network security
mechanisms. S can express variant policies, to allow secu-
rity expressions of quality of service requests, and can have
dynamic security elements to accommodate multiple situa-
tion-based policies. In particular, S can represent both (1)
static security requirements that may be implemented in a
system, as well as (2) the results of running a particular job
or set of jobs against such static requirements. The latter
usage will be examined in the next section, to express
QoSS in a resource management system benefit function.
3  Network-Scheduler Benefit Function
As discussed above, various mechanisms exist for man-
aging contention for, and allotment of distributed network
resources. One class of these mechanisms attempts to effi-
ciently schedule the execution of multiple (possibly simul-
taneous) jobs on multiple distributed computers (e.g., the
MSHN project  [8]  [23]  [24]  [11]  [17] ), where each job
requires a determinable subset of the resources. Of interest
is a benefit function for comparing the effectiveness of
such job scheduling mechanisms when they are presented
with real or hypothetical “data sets” of jobs.
Jobs are assigned priorities for use in resolving resource
contention and allocation issues. In some systems, a job’s
priority may depend upon the particular operating mode of
the network. [8]  Also, the different data formats of a multi-
ple-format job may have different preferences (e.g.,
assigned by a user or “hard wired” as part of the applica-
tion or job-scheduler database), and different levels of
resource usage. [10]  [12]  A network job scheduler should
receive more credit in the benefit function for scheduling
high priority and high preference jobs, as opposed to low
priority or low preference jobs. That is to say, a scheduler
is intuitively doing a better job if important jobs, as judged
by priority and preference, receive more attention than
unimportant jobs. How much weight the priorities and
preferences are given is a matter of network scheduling
policy.
For illustration, we introduce a simple benefit function,
B, to measure how well a scheduler meets the goals of user
preference and system priorities (see  [4] , [12] and [21]
for other approaches). This function averages preference
(p) and priority (P) (use of a priority and preference in
measuring network effectiveness have been introduced for
the MSHN project [10] ).
Where the characteristic function X is defined for i, j as:
Xij = 1 if format i was successfully delivered to job j
within time Tj, else 0
and at most one format is completed per job:
Jobs and formats are defined as above.
Pj is the priority of job j
 The formats for a job are assigned preferences (p) by
the user such that:
0 <= p <= 1
mj is the number of {format, preference} pairs
assigned for job j
pij is the preference the user has assigned to format i,
job j
the preferences for a job add up to 1:
:
This approach assumes that users will assign preference
values that correspond to resource usage, since we want the
benefit function to indicate a higher value when the sched-
uler succeeds in scheduling “harder” jobs [12] .
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3.1  Adding Security to the Benefit Function
We wish the benefit function to reflect the ef fectiveness
and restrictions of the security policy. First, we define the
characteristic security function Z, for i and j:
Zij = 1 if the instantiated value of all components in Sij
are true, else 0
The numerator of the benefit function is multiplied by Z,
so that no credit is given for jobs that fail to meet the secu-
rity requirements:
Now, for variant components, we wish to be able to give
less credit to the scheduler for fulfilling less “difficult”
security requirements. One algorithm for expressing this is
for each instantiated component (c) in Sij to be assigned a
security completion token (g) where . gc will
indicate the completion token corresponding to component
S.c. gc is defined to be the “percentage” of [S.c] met or
exceeded by the instantiated value of the component’s
LHS (notated as S.c”):
gc = S.c” / [S.c]
To illustrate the calculation of g1, for component S.1:
S.1: % of packets authenticated >= 50, <= 90; inc 10
[S.1] = 5 (the number of quanta in S.1),   S.1” = 3   (the
job achieves the 3rd quantum (70))
g1 = 3/5 = 0.6
For invariant components, g = 1 or g = 0. A token (g)
whose value is 0 represents a job “failing” the component’s
security policy. Recall that Z will be 0 when the job/format
fails to meet the requirement of any security component,
meaning that the function returns no benefit value for that
job/format. We introduce a function (A) which averages the
tokens of a job:
Aij = (g1 + g2 + .. + gn)/n
where n = [Sij]  -- the number of components in Sij
and
Averages, such as A, over many different elements can
tend to minimize the difference that is seen between differ-
ent data sets. Therefore, we weight the tokens (g) assigned
to individual security components to give more credence to
components that are “more important” than others, e.g.,
reflecting netw ork management policies. Each gn has a cor-
responding integer weight (wn), . So Aij becomes:
Aij = (g1w1 + g2w2 + .. + gnwn)/(w1 + w2 + .. + wn)
again
In the final expression of the network benefit function, A
is added to the numerator, providing an average of security,
priority and preference.
, where 1 indicates the maximum
scheduling effectiveness.
3.2  Applicability
This technique for quantifying the variant security
instantiated by a resource management system is being
used in the MSHN project as a factor in representing the
effectiveness of its resource assignments [10] . In the
MSHN design, the security requirements of network
resources (represented by S) are stored in a Resource
Requirements Database. This database is consulted during
the resource scheduling phase to effectively match jobs to
resources. We expect that this measurement technique
could also be applied to other resource management sys-
tems, such as Condor [15]  and Globus [7] .
While different schedulers could be compared with
respect to the individual components of B, a summary
function such as B would be useful to automate and nor-
malize the comparison process. Additionally, we expect
that the security component (viz, A) in an operational sys-
tem would be complex enough to evade effective manual
analysis.
4  Discussion and Conclusion
A security vector has been presented for describing
functional requirements of network security policies. It has
been shown that this vector can be used for representing
security with respect to both quality of service and a net-
work scheduler benefit function.
We are involved in ongoing work to organize the secu-
rity vector into a “normal form” with sub-vectors or hierar-
chies corresponding to security policy jurisdictions (such
as: access control, auditing, and authentication) and to
incorporate a costing methodology for security compo-
nents, such as can be provided to a resource management
system  [9] . We are working to develop a means of adjust-
ing the preference expression with a notion of the corre-
sponding resource usage  [12] . We are considering how to
expand the security benefit function (A) to reflect user qual-
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ity of security service choices within the range allowed by
variant security components, and to reflect performance
implications of redundant security mechanisms.
The organizational security policy [20] governing the
network may allow individuals or principals representing
them to override rules represented by invariant security
vector components. For example, a military commander
might decide to forgo cryptographic secrecy mechanisms
for a job in an emergency (e.g., to improve network perfor-
mance), even though the system has not been configured
with “dynamic” or “variant” security mechanisms, as
defined herein. From the perspective of the security vector
S and the benefit function, this is a change to or violation
of the computer security policy. It is recommended that this
type of policy change be audited.
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